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The Keyes of Constitutional Law
Justin Driver*

INTRODUCTION

Before beginning law school in 2001, I knew the names of an
embarrassingly small number of judicial decisions. The only case names that I
readily possessed were Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Bush v.
Gore, and a smattering of other opinions that had managed to escape the
narrow confines of the legal community.' I did, however, know the name of at
least one relatively obscure opinion, Goldberg v. Kelly, though I would have
been at an utter loss if I were asked to identify the holding, the parties, or even
the underlying dispute. 2 The sole reason that I had encountered Goldberg v.
Kelly is this year's Jorde lecturer, Professor Owen Fiss of Yale Law School.
Some of my closest friends from Oxford University started law school in
New Haven, Connecticut, in the fall of 2000, one year before I was set to begin
law school up the road in Cambridge, Massachusetts. When I anxiously pressed
these friends for the most salient details of their first few weeks of legal
education, several of them mentioned how their instructor for Civil Procedure
(whatever that was) focused for several weeks in a row on a single case. While
this arrangement sounded to me then something like The Paper Chase meets
Groundhog Day, they insisted that it was fascinating to refract one opinion
through various prisms in order to elucidate foundational points about our legal
system. What made a much deeper impression on me than anything about
Goldberg v. Kelly, though, was the way that Professor Fiss's students-my
buddies-would utter his name in what can only be described as hushed tones.
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1. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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It was plain simply from the way that they almost whispered his name that
Owen Fiss inspired deep reverence, even from my most irreverent peers.
Recently, I emailed three old friends who attended Yale to notify them
about my role in today's event and to ask them what precisely about Professor
Fiss evoked such veneration. Despite being quite prominent in their chosen
fields (not legal academia, I might add), they all responded with alacrity,
emphasizing virtually identical themes regarding the significance of Professor
Fiss's presence in the classroom and beyond. The first friend called Fiss "the
moral center of the law school," and she noted that he taught, regardless of
"what kind of law you were practicing, there was no point unless you had first
developed a .. . clear understanding of justice and dedicated yourself to
pursuing it. This may sound old fashioned but actually it's a timeless and brave
idea." The second friend stated: "[Fiss] had a special gift (and passion) for
teaching us not to just make arguments based on logic, but also based on a
sense of justice. He . .. insisted that we not stop at 'what is the right answer,'
but really grapple with 'is the answer right?' That's in the spirit of Yale Law
School, but Owen Fiss was the keeper of the flame." The third student
reflected:
In ways that I'm really only appreciating now, [Fiss's] focus on
looking to the past as a means of keeping the flame of legal
imagination alive about what the law could accomplish in fighting
both individual and systematic wrongs ... was a welcome antidote to a
period when that imagination seemed at a low ebb.... Said another
way, there was something about Professor Fiss that seemed almost old
fashioned at the time, but I now see as resolute and alive to a moment
when the possibilities of the past could be made present again.
These essential lessons that Professor Fiss imparted to his students more
than fifteen years ago also eventually made a deep impression on me. Though I
never had the privilege of being in a class taught by Professor Fiss, much of my
scholarly writing over the last decade establishes that I am very much his
student. Like Professor Fiss, I aim to emphasize in my own work the
egalitarian contributions that the Supreme Court has made to the nation,
resisting those who depict the Court as a fundamentally fragile institution. Like
Professor Fiss, I aim to honor the possibilities of judicial decision making, even
while taking care to chart the yawning gap that separates constitutional ideals
from contemporary constitutional realities.
Apart from our shared overarching ambitions, which some would
doubtless dismiss as quixotic, Professor Fiss's work also played a significant
role in inspiring my first book, The Schoolhouse Gate: Pubic Education, the
3
Supreme Court, and the Battlefor the American Mind. It provides a panoramic
examination of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions that have shaped
JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT,
3.
AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND (2018).
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students' rights, placing those opinions in historical context and advancing
normative claims about the future of the domain. Although I have long
nurtured an interest in the field of education law, it is-to put the point
mildly-in no grave danger of being mistaken for legal academia's hottest area.
Many of the nation's leading law schools do not regularly offer a course in the
law of schools. Indeed, one of the central goals that animates my project is to
reinvigorate the field of education law. The prefix in the word "reinvigorate,"
of course, suggests that there were in fact halcyon days of yore that someday
might return. Professor Fiss's early scholarship-much of which he undertook
here at the University of Chicago, and occurred in what would become known
as the field of education law-played no small role in affirming my decision to
undertake The Schoolhouse Gate. If the formidable Professor Fiss deemed the
subject matter worthy of sustained engagement, my thinking ran at the outset,
then I could certainly dedicate my intellectual energy to immersing myself in
this understudied field.4 My work aims to bring constitutional law scholars into
conversation with education law scholars, even though those two groups
seldom have sustained exchanges in the modem era. This task is vital, I
contend, because the two areas have influenced each other in significant, toooften-overlooked ways.
In perhaps no area is the connection between these two fields clearer and
more gravid than the Supreme Court's decision to reject what Professor Fiss
evocatively labels the theory of "cumulative responsibility."' Simply put, the
doctrine of cumulative responsibility suggests that, as a constitutional matter,
the duty for addressing racial inequality falls on American entities not south of
the Mason-Dixon Line, but instead south of the Canadian border. In many
constitutional law courses, the Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis, from
1976, is identified as the constitutional culprit in a narrative that could have
afforded much stronger protection to racial minorities under the Equal
Protection Clause.6 To the extent that an education law case is understood as
laying the groundwork for Davis, most constitutional professors lay blame at
the feet of Milliken v. Bradley, the case from 1974 that invalidated a courtordered inter-district desegregation program in metropolitan Detroit,
Michigan.7
Yet, I contend that this conventional account overlooks an important
forerunner for Davis in the educational realm, a case from 1973 called Keyes v.
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado.8 While Keyes acknowledged that
unconstitutionally segregated schools existed outside of the South, the Court

4. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significancefor Northern
School Desegregation,38 U. Cm. L. REV 697 (1971).
5. See Owen Fiss, The Accumulation ofDisadvantages, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 1946 (2018).
6. See 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
7. See 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
8. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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nevertheless imputed liability to non-southern jurisdictions only by identifying
intentionally discriminatory acts-a technique that made it unduly difficult for
civil rights plaintiffs to prevail on desegregation suits. While proponents of
desegregation won the narrow battle for liability in Keyes, that opinion also
contained the seeds of the modern Equal Protection Clause governing race.
Thus, for students of racial inequality and the Constitution, wrestling with the
Keyes of constitutional law is nothing less than key.
I.
In Keyes, the Supreme Court resolved a lawsuit that black and Latino
students filed challenging school segregation in the Mile-High City. Because
neither Denver nor Colorado had enacted official laws requiring racially
segregated schools, many observers predicted before Keyes that the Court
would seize the opportunity to devise a standard to regulate de facto
segregation. 9 As it would turn out, however, the Court confounded such
expectations. Rather than broadly requiring educators to remedy segregated
school conditions-wherever they appeared, and whatever their origins-Keyes
instead held Denver liable for its racially isolated schools by issuing a highly
fact-sensitive decision finding fault with the school board itself.
In a 7-1 decision, Justice William Brennan wrote an opinion for the Court
emphasizing that the board had intentionally gerrymandered attendance zones
near the city's predominantly black Park Hill community-and even built an
atypically small school in the middle of that neighborhood-in efforts to
maintain segregated education. Such actions were, according to Keyes,
sufficient to render the entire school system's pupil assignment method
unconstitutional, as the board's actions evinced the "purpose or intent to
segregate." 10 That criterion would become the touchstone for determining

9. See Christopher Jencks, Busing: The Supreme Court Goes North, N.Y. TIMES, November
19, 1972, at SM40.
10. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. See id., 206 ("[T]he Board, through its actions over a period of
years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated character of the core city schools."). The
Denver School Board argued that some of its schools should be regarded as integrated because African
Americans and Mexican Americans attended the institutions together, even though they were joined
by a trivial number of white students. Keyes, however, flatly rejected this argument, concluding in
effect that schools that happen to be located where the barrio meets the ghetto do not adequately
present the ideal of racial integration that the Court envisioned. Keyes held that it was erroneous to
"separat[e] Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of defining a 'segregated' school" because "much
evidence [indicates] that in the Southwest Hispanos and Negroes have a great many things in
common." Id. at 197. The two racial groups' shared history of "discrimination in treatment when
compared with the treatment afforded Anglo students" meant that legal challengers were "entitled to
have schools with a combined predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the category of
'segregated' schools." Id. at 198. This understanding of segregation complicates the view advanced by
some commentators who have suggested that the nation's increased racial diversity in recent decades,
which has affected the composition of the nation's public schools, indicates that schools
predominantly made up of students from two different minority groups should be viewed as evidence
of a desegregating nation. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopolous, Civil Rights in a DesegregatingAmerica,

2018]

THE KEYES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1935

whether racially isolated schools violated the Constitution in jurisdictions that
lacked Jim Crow laws, and would be imported into the overall structure for
determining violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
In certain respects, however, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a more
noteworthy, and more poignant, opinion in Keyes than did the majority. Justice
Powell's separate opinion endorsed the Court's conclusion in Keyes, but would
have reached that destination via a markedly different route. Knowledgeable
observers eagerly awaited Powell's vote in Keyes because it represented the
first time that he would weigh in on school desegregation-at least as a
member of the Supreme Court. Powell's prior involvement with these issues
provided advocates of robust desegregation little, if any, reason for believing
that he would champion their cause. As Chairman of the Richmond School
Board when the Court issued Brown v. Board of Education, Powell oversaw a
system that for six full years after the decision saw not a single black student
attend school with white students. In 1959, when educators in Prince Edward
County decided to close their schools rather than integrate them, Powell
announced "public education will be continued in our city-although every
proper effort will be made to minimize the extent of integration when it
comes.""1
Assessed only by the racial composition of Richmond's schools, Powell
proved to be a man of his word. When he departed the school board in the
spring of 1961, only two of the city's more than 20,000 black pupils attended
school with whites. During his confirmation hearings, which yielded an 89-1
vote in his favor, Powell successfully avoided responsibility for this dismal
desegregation record by noting that Virginia had removed pupil-assignment
authority from local school boards and instead consigned that authority to a
state agency. In the intervening years, however, Powell had not exactly
acquired a reputation as a crusading proponent of desegregation. To the
contrary, Powell filed an amicus brief in a North Carolina desegregation case,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, where he mounted a
withering attack against busing efforts on consequentialist grounds. Busing
would result in a perverse failure, Powell maintained, because its introduction
would serve only to accelerate white flight, thus intensifying the very problem
that it sought to alleviate.12

83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1393-1415 (2016); EDWARD GLAESER & JACOB VIGDOR, THE END OF
THE
SEGREGATED CENTURY: RACIAL SEPARATION IN AMERICA'S NEIGHBORHOODS, 1890-2010
(2012).
11.
JAMES E. RYAN, FIvE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two SCHOOLS, AND
THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 47 (2010). For a thoughtful

evaluation of Ryan's book, see Wendy Parker, The Failings of EducationReform and the Promiseof
Integration,90 TEX. L. REV. 395 (2011).
12.

See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (1994).
In the

fall of 1960, two black teenage girls began attending what had been an entirely white junior high
school. See id at 141. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S.
1
(1971).
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To the surprise of many onlookers, Powell's opinion in Keyes proposed
to
nothing less than fundamentally reconceptualizing the judiciary's approach
the racial composition of schools by calling for the abandonment of the dejure
/ de facto distinction, and the implementation of "a uniform, constitutional
of
approach to our national problem of school segregation."' 3 Instead
examining a school board's motives in areas that lacked formal laws requiring
that
segregated education, as the majority did in Keyes, Powell contended
of
existence
the
correcting
on
courts throughout the nation should concentrate
northern
in
phenomenon
racially isolated schools-hardly an unknown
jurisdictions: "[I]f our national concern is for those who attend [segregated]
schools, . . . we must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools is no
4

1
less in Denver than in Atlanta."
Extending upon a Supreme Court precedent, which required a school
district in rural Virginia to take affirmative steps to discontinue its dual school
system, Powell promoted the adoption of a nationwide rule that would have
required, under the Constitution, schools to pursue racial integration. Powell
maintained that students should be understood as possessing "the right, derived
from the Equal Protection Clause, to expect that ... local school boards will
operate integratedschool systems within their respective districts. This means
that school authorities . .. must make and implement their customary decisions
with a view toward enhancing integrated school opportunities."" Powell's new
constitutional standard would have compelled school officials, among other
measures, to establish attendance zones that would facilitate integration, open
schools in locations to foster integration, and, if the district provided students
with transportation to school, draw routes within reason to promote integration.
This far-reaching opinion would have mandated schools in de facto segregated
jurisdictions to pursue racial integration in a far more aggressive fashion than
anything the Court had yet mandated, or, indeed, has compelled to date.
Cutting against this sweeping remedy, however, Powell did aim in Keyes
to dial back the status quo in one major respect: he would not have obligated
schools to bus students for the purpose of maximizing integration, even in areas
of de jure segregation. Powell repeatedly expressed anxieties about studentsparticularly young students-being bused great distances away from their
homes. This aversion to extensive busing programs, Powell noted, stemmed
from concerns that such practices could devastate the sense of community
engendered when youngsters living in the same neighborhood attended the
same school. 16 Consistent with his overarching requirement for integration,

13. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Id at 219.
authorities
15. Id. at 225-226 (emphasis in original). See also id at 226 ("Where school
in
opportunities
integrative
with
be
must
also
this
students,
of
transportation
the
decide to undertake
mind.").
that
16. Id at 246. See also id. at 242 ("The Equal Protection Clause does, indeed, command
not
does
it
But
authorities.
school
public
of
racial discrimination not be tolerated in the decisions
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however, Powell made clear that he used the term "neighborhood school" in an
elastic sense: a neighborhood school was a school close to a student's home,
though not necessarily the absolute closest school. 17
II.
Keyes marked a pivotal moment in the Court's desegregation
jurisprudence because it-more acutely than any other single decision-shone
a light on what could have been, and indeed what already should have been, in
this area. In Keyes, the Court faced a clear opportunity to move away from the
hunt for bad actors and toward considering whether school districts throughout
the country in fact contained pockets of racially isolated schools. Wherever
such pockets occurred, the Court should have made it incumbent upon
educators to address that issue, an approach that would have acknowledged the
nation's "cumulative responsibility" for the isolation of racial minorities.
Instead, Keyes clung to the de jure / de facto distinction, tweaking the
traditional mindset ever so slightly by finding that there were some evildoers in
non-southern jurisdictions who acted with an impermissible purpose by taking
identifiable steps to isolate racial minorities, and who in effect should be
treated as operating de jure segregated school systems. In so doing, the Court
wrongly perpetuated the fiction that many communities existed throughout the
nation where racial minorities simply happened to cluster due to their own
preferences, rather than being forced into racialized ghettos through a complex
web of mutually reinforcing public and private exclusions.
The Court's emphasis on discriminatory purpose seems particularly
misguided in the educational sphere because it obfuscates how segregated
schools are invariably the product of some official governmental action,
namely the assignment of students to attend designated schools. When
educators' current pupil assignment plans result in racially
isolated schools,
they must decide either to perpetuate or to remediate that condition.
Perpetuating de facto segregation in schools by retaining pupil assignment
plans should not, however, be misunderstood as tantamount to making no
decision at all. Embracing an effects-based test for school segregation would
have had the virtue of dramatically lightening the evidentiary burden on
litigants and civil rights organizations. Rather than being required to identify
some particular wayward step where the actions of school officials revealed
impermissible racial considerations, parties seeking desegregation could have
instead simply identified schools with student bodies that were predominantly
racial minorities. In other words, the Supreme Court should have interpreted
the Constitution to require school districts to pursue racial integration
require that school authorities undertake widespread student transportation solely
for the sake of
maximizing integration.").
17. See id at 245 n.25 ("In the school context, 'neighborhood' refers to relative
proximity, to a
preference for a school near to, rather than more distant from, home.").
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from
throughout the nation regardless of their recent history-taking a cue
to
Justice Powell's opinion in Keyes, even if it declined to adopt his aversion
busing. That an opinion written by Justice Powell-a man who steadfastly
adult member of
sought to prop up Jim Crow's crumbling edifice, even as an
advance
the bar-could in any meaningful sense be understood as seeking to
the
the Court's pursuit of school integration serves only to underscore
of
composition
racial
the
regulated
disgraceful timidity with which the Court
8
schools during the long post-Brown era.'
Had the Supreme Court in Keyes embraced a more results-oriented
adoption of
approach to locating unconstitutional segregation in schools, the
judiciary's
the
such a standard could well have had profound implications for
The
proposition.
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as a general
Court decided Keyes three years before it decided Washington v. Davis, the
racial
most influential opinion in shaping the Fourteenth Amendment's
lawsuit
a
involved
Davis
decades.
landscape decided during the last five
challenging the legitimacy of a standardized test for becoming a police officer
that black applicants failed at a disproportionately high rate compared to white
absent
applicants. Davis interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to mean that
racially-discriminatory
produce
highly unusual circumstances, measures that
do not
effects, but that were not adopted for racially-discriminatory purposes,
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Davis's holding has succeeded in making
it extremely difficult for racial minorities to prevail on claims under the Equal
Protection Clause in the modem era. But that outcome at least plausibly could
have been different if Keyes had adopted an effect-based segregation standard,
and that standard informed the Court's general view of the Equal Protection
Clause that it would subsequently devise in Davis. Viewed from the opposite
angle, Keyes's purpose-based standard can be understood as laying the

19
foundation for the Court's reasoning in Davis.
Criticizing Keyes for its failure to realize the prospect of momentous
school integration throughout the nation should not be dismissed as the product
of hindsight. To the contrary, a prominent theme of the media's
contemporaneous coverage of Keyes emphasized the decision's refusal to

18.

DAVID L.
For works that influenced the ideas contained in the preceding paragraphs, see

285 (1982); CASS
KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEAL OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
THE COLOR OF LAw: A
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
(2017); and Ta-Nehisi
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA

for the proposition that
Coates, The Casefor Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 54. For support
Fennell, Searchingfor
Anne
Lee
see
separation,
racial
of
levels
high
blacks have not typically desired
FairHousing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349 (2017).
of Washington
19. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). For an important critique
Reckoning with
v. Davis, see Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
see Davis,
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). For evidence of this last proposition,
also adhered to
426 U.S. at 240 (citing Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189) ("The school desegregation cases have
to be racially
the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.").
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articulate a sufficiently demanding desegregation standard for non-southern
jurisdictions. Thus, the Chicago Defender noted that lawyers "believe that the
Supreme Court missed a precious opportunity to end any legal distinction
between de facto discrimination and de jure segregation." 20 The Los Angeles
Times added: "By its decision, the court in effect has accepted a double
standard in which the intent of school boards is irrelevant in the South and
paramount in the North in determining judicial remedy to segregation."2 1 In a
similar vein, the Washington Post's editorial board noted that, though "Denver
was generally thought to be the first 'de facto' segregation case the Court
would rule on," Keyes in fact "made essentially a 'Southern' finding" by
"deal[ing] with Denver on 'de jure' lines." 22
By the early 1970s, no one could seriously doubt the prevalence of
segregation in non-southern communities. In 1971, according to data collected
by the federal government, the percentage of black students who attended
schools where the student body was greater than 80 percent black stood at
staggeringly high levels in many northern and western jurisdictions, including:
90 percent in St. Louis, Missouri; 91 percent in Cleveland, Ohio; 91 percent in
Newark, New Jersey; 96 percent in Gary, Indiana; and 98 percent in Compton,
California. In Chicago, Illinois, nearly half of the city's elementary schools
reported greater than 90 percent black student bodies, and more than one in
four reported 100 percent black student bodies. By at least one
measure,
moreover, non-southern jurisdictions at this time featured starker rates of
school segregation than southern jurisdictions: although 44 percent of black
students in the South attended schools with a majority of white students, only
28 percent of their counterparts in the North and West could say the same.23
It would be profoundly mistaken, though, to believe that the issue of de
facto segregation only recently attracted attention when the Court essentially
opted to evade this fundamental question in 1973 with Keyes. Long before that
time, individuals occupying a wide array of positions in American societyranging from judges to journalists, from professors to politicians, from ordinary
citizens to extraordinary essayists-had all identified de facto segregation as a
serious problem that demanded remediation. In the early 1960s, some federal
judges issued opinions that deemed de facto segregation unconstitutional, even
as other federal judges disagreed; the Supreme Court, moreover, during that
decade repeatedly declined invitations to reverse conservative circuit court
decisions on this question that arose in various cities-including Gary, Indiana,
Kansas City, Kansas, and Cincinnati, Ohio.24 As Brown approached its tenth
20. Editorial, As the Court Sees It, CHI. DEFENDER, June 26, 1973, at 13 (emphasis added).
21. Editorial, The Court'sDouble Standard, L.A. TIMEs, June 22, 1973, at C6.
22. Editorial, Denver:A 'Southern'Findingin the West, WASH. POST, June 22, 1973, at
A22.
23. See 118 CONG. REC. 1, 563-66 (1972); Austin Scott, 20 Years After School
Ruling
Institutions Still Segregated, WASH. POST, May 18, 1974, at A2.
24. See Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 100 (1973);
Deal
v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967);
Downs v.
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anniversary in 1964, Anthony Lewis surveyed the broad landscape of
segregation in the New York Times Magazine. "[I]t should not be disturbing
"The
that all the country is now engaged in the race problem," Lewis wrote.
pretense,
a
that,
just
was
pretense that the problem existed only in the South
25
and it is better to have the truth out, however painful it is." One year later,
Owen Fiss wrote a significant article in the HarvardLaw Review contending
that Brown, and its requirement for "equality of educational opportunity, may
in some instances be violated by the maintenance of racially imbalanced
of
schools," and insisting further that "[t]he refusal to recoil from the specter
such reform is rooted in Brecht's intellectual injunction, 'When a thing
continually occurs / Not on that account find it natural. ,"26A few months later,
President Lyndon Baines Johnson requested a report from the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights examining racial isolation in public schools,
venues.
presumably with an eye toward attacking segregation in non-southern
As far back as the 1950s, a protestor of school conditions in New York City
a placard that
sought to draw attention to northern-style segregation by carrying 27
read: "Is Brooklyn, New York above the Mason Dixon line?" Finally, in
1965, James Baldwin similarly highlighted the absurdity of the de facto

City of
Bd. of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School
v. School City of
Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Bell
Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181
Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Taylor v. Bd. of Educ. of New
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
25.

AND SCHOOL
J. HARVIE WILKINSON lfl, FROMBROWNTO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT

TIMES,
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, 53 (quoting Anthony Lewis, Since the Supreme CourtSpoke, N.Y.

TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN
May 10, 1964, at 9, 93). See also DIANE RAVITCH, THE

Magazine revisited this
EDUCATION, 1945-1980, at 171 (1983). Four years later, the New York Times
Court's record on
Supreme
the
of
critique
a
published
Steel
Lewis
named
issue when an attorney
the Court's failure to
racial equality titled, "Nine Men in Black Who Think White." Steel criticized
in schools, and further
correct the repeated circuit court opinions approving of "accidental segregation"
"will yield small
commented that Green's recent tough stance on segregation in rural Virginia
Lewis M. Steel,
segregation."
facto
de
of
question
the
tackle
to
agrees
dividends unless the Court also
112.
Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. TIMES MAG., October 13, 1968, at 56,
Concepts, 78
Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
26.
67
Desegregation,
and
Court
Warren
HARV. L. REV. 564, 617 (1965). See Robert L. Carter, The
not dealt
has
It
Brown.
extended
or
expanded
not
has
Court
("The
(1968)
241-42
237,
MICH. L. REV.
explosive today as
with the question of de facto school segregation-an issue which is as potentially
in the context
means
education
equal
what
know
not
do
we
Therefore,
1954.
in
was formal segregation
A
Segregation:
School
Facto
De
of Northern-style school segregation."); Frank I. Goodman,
(1972).
275
REV.
L.
CALIF.
60
Analysis,
Empirical
and
Constitutional
THE NATIONAL
MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND
27.
ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
COMMISSION
U.S.
also
See
(2016).
37
DESEGREGATION
SCHOOL
TO
RESISTANCE

from
RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); RAVITCH, supra note 25, at 171. Speaking
northern
decried
Connecticut
of
Ribicoff
Abraham
Senator
1972,
in
Senate
U.S.
the
the floor of
you do not want to
hypocrisy on segregation. "Our motto seems to have been 'Do to southerners what
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category by quipping: "De facto segregation means Negroes are segregated, but
nobody did it." 2 8
Thus, despite vociferous complaints about defacto segregation arising in
many different comers of the national discourse, the Supreme Court simply
turned a deaf ear to this issue for many years. And, indeed, it could be argued
with some force that the Court has never answered the call. Had the Supreme
Court demonstrated any urgency whatsoever in combatting de facto
segregation when those issues initially appeared in the federal courts, the
liberal Warren Court would have resolved the question, virtually guaranteeing
a progressive victory on this issue. When the Supreme Court, under Chief
Justice Burger's leadership, finally agreed to resolve a case arising from a de
facto jurisdiction with Keyes, moreover, its analytical approach foundered
badly by blinking the issue away, shunting Denver into the dejure framework.
III.
Surveying the state of racial isolation in the country's public schools
today, forty-five years after Keyes, provides ample reason for pessimism about
the rate of progress. Throughout the nation, more than one in three black
students now attend schools whose student bodies are composed of at least 90
percent racial minorities; in the Northeast, more than one in two black students
attend such schools. Perhaps even more distressingly, those figures have
increased since the early 1990s, when the Supreme Court began its hasty retreat
from this realm by allowing school districts to abandon their desegregation
commitments. While the nation's school system as a whole has become more
diverse in recent decades, largely due to the sharp increase of Latino students,
many Latinos are also concentrated in overwhelmingly minority schools.
Some commentators in recent years have documented the rise of what
they call "apartheid schools," where white students make up 1 percent or less
of the student body; in 1988, there were fewer than three thousand such
schools, but by 2011, there were nearly seven thousand, accounting for
approximately 7 percent of the public schools in the entire nation. Relatedly,
some major school districts-not schools, mind you, but entire districtscontain astonishingly tiny percentages of white pupils. In the school year that
ended in 2013, for instance, a mere 5 percent of public school students in
Dallas, Texas, were white; that same figure was 9 percent in Los
Angeles,
California, 11 percent in Washington, D.C., and 12 percent in Boston,
Massachusetts. While public schools with very few nonwhite students have
decreased in recent years, some scholars have suggested that this salutary
development may have the regrettable effect of communicating a misleading
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While I vehemently disagree with the Court's outcome in Parents Involved,
that opinion cannot be held primarily responsible for the sorry state of racial
integration in schools. Many commentators alternately hoped and feared that
Parents Involved spelled the end of efforts to enhance racial integration in
schools. But those expectations have not yet materialized.
Integration plans are hardly pervasive, but neither are they unprecedented.
The most reliable recent assessment indicates that educators in approximately
seventy school districts around the country continue to employ various methods
of increasing racial integration in their schools. While these various methods
may not be as efficient at achieving meaningful integration as classifying
students according to race, they do leave enterprising school districts with at
least some room to maneuver. Typically, they do so by-consistent with
Justice Anthony Kennedy's controlling opinion in Parents Involvedestablishing attendance zones with awareness of the racial demographics in
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It is certainly possible that ParentsInvolved and the threat of litigation
have deterred school districts from voluntarily enacting integration plans when
they would otherwise have done so. But that account seems a highly
implausible explanation for the relative paucity of pro-integration school
programs in existence today. Few school districts pursued racial integration
before the Court decided ParentsInvolved, and few do so afterward; the tepid
appetite for genuine racial integration in education, at least as assessed by the
enacted policies, represents a continuous theme in modem American education.
The primary obstacle to realizing meaningfully integrated schools nowadays
comes not in the form of an unbending judiciary, but instead an inert body
politic. In the event that a desire for meaningful racial integration in schools
somehow gains traction, current constitutional doctrine should not be
misunderstood to foreclose attempts at vindicating those interests. In other
words, even if the Supreme Court can be understood to have rejected the
doctrine of "cumulative responsibility," nothing the Court has done prohibits
the rest of us from embracing it. That idea may sound hopelessly old-fashioned,
but what once was old can become new again.
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